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Abstract
In his stimulating contribution, Corrado Roversi uses speech act theory to propose a more nu-
anced and shaded account of how agents can relate themselves to institutions than H. Hart’s
binary distinction between the internal and external point of view. Although we agree on the
central importance of Hart in charting recent work in social ontology, we propose to recast
Roversi’s contribution in terms of the various ways in which an agent’s (lack of) commitment
to an institution can corrode or strengthen an institution. In the first part we highlight several
features of the internal/external distinction as developed by Hart and others. Whereas the in-
ternal point of view is manifested by following the rules and criticizing others for failing to do
so, the external point of view can be characterized by, amongst others, a rejection of the rules
or a theoretical understanding from the outside. The second part critically examines Roversi’s
proposal as exemplified with the different kinds of chess players. Instead, several points at
which a player might fail to commit himself to the institution of chess are identified, arguing
that this provides a better taxonomy than the one proposed by Roversi. The last section deals
with the ‘perlocutionary’ goal of institutions, stressing that all institutions attempt to solve
pre-institutional coordination problems.
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Sometimes, a simply binary distinction is all you need to articulate a profound
insight. Such was H.L.A. Hart’s between the internal and the external point of
view on the law. In this reply to Corrado Roversi’s paper, we take issue with his
‘broader and more shaded’ account of Hart’s distinction, argue that the chess anal-
ogy (and other analogies between institutions and ludic games) is misleading, and
that the real issue is the relation between acceptance as a key feature of occupying
the internal point of view and various ways a participant’s commitment to an in-
stitution can corrode. We agree with Roversi that Hart’s The Concept of Law forms
the perfect background to chart recent work in social ontology and the nature of
agent’s personal commitments to institutions, but differ on the key way of how to
further explore that connection. In the first section of this reply, we rehearse some
central features of the internal/external –distinction as developed by Hart and,
more recently, Scott Shapiro’s important comments on Hart. In the second sec-
tion, we connect Roversi’s comments with (what we think are) ways (acceptance
of) an institution can corrode. In the final section, we draw attention to what one
might call the ‘perlocutionary’ dimension of institutional actions, i.e. the extent
to which actions intentional under an institutional description aim at effects that
make sense under external, non-institutional descriptions.
A key aim of The Concept of Law was to reject that legal rules are, in a broad
sense, threats backed by sanctions and (legal) obligations predictions about what
would happen to you if you would break the law. Reductive theories neglect that
the law, like other institutions, exists because and in virtue of a practical attitude
of rule-acceptance (Shapiro 2006). The internal point of view refers to ‘a specific
kind of normative attitude held by certain insiders, namely, those who accept the
legitimacy of the rules’ (Shapiro 2006, p. 1164). In Searle’s work on social ontol-
ogy, collective acceptance of constitutive rules is the mental attitude in virtue of
which both formal and informal social institutions persist. As Harts put it in the
Postscript to The Concept of Law, “(acceptance) consists in the standing disposi-
tion of individuals to take such patterns of conduct as guides to their own future
conduct and as standards of criticism which may legitimate demands and various
forms of pressure” (also quoted by Shapiro 2006, p. 1163).
Agents who (sometimes reluctantly) accept the rules of an institution express
or show that attitude in various ways (simply stating that you accept them is not
sufficient!). The primary and most obvious way in which they manifest acceptance
is through behavior that can be described as following the rules. (Not, as Wittgen-
stein famously pointed out in his Philosophical Investigations, by acting according
to the rules, which can be motivated by desires external to it.) But that can’t be
enough, since even those who disagree with the institution because they think it
is inefficient, or gives undue advantages to certain groups, or whatever, usually fol-
low the rules. A second feature is that acceptors, as we shall call them, will also
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criticize others when they fail to conform to the rules, and they will do so using
normative concepts. ‘You ought to stop here’ or ‘it was wrong to insult the judge’
are, according to Hart, ‘internal’ statements because they reflect, and show others
that they reflect, acceptance of the rules of the institutions (in Hart’s specific case,
acceptance of the law). Deviancy of the rules is deemed to be illegitimate and the
criticizers are usually not criticized because they do so. They can be criticized be-
cause they, for some reason, are seen as submitting to the law, or the rules of the
institution.
The external point of view itself encompasses many options, according to Hart.
There is, first, the point of view of the person who doesn’t accept the (formal or
informal) rules of the institution and is, by those who accept them, criticized for
that attitude – or perhaps listened at. A critical exchange can give rise to revisions
of the rules, and, in a more radical scenario, to the disappearance of the institu-
tion. It is important to note that such criticisms introduce other points of view,
or further considerations, for example, moral or prudential ones, into the discus-
sion, and they can do so because acceptance of a system of (formal or informal)
rules does not entail that one approves of the institution. An institution can be
criticized on moral grounds, but also, and less recognized in philosophy of law
and social ontology, because the rules of the institution offer suboptimal solutions
to the coordination problem the particular institution is supposed to handle. An
institution is typically a solution to a complex human coordination problem, an
equilibrium that has been reached through tradition, negotiation or by fiat (Gin-
tis 2010). It is at this stage that Roversi’s extensive appeal to the chess analogy
may be misleading. Playing (and winning) a game of chess, is usually thought of
as an end in itself, while following the rules of an institution (and thus manifest-
ing acceptance of those rules) is recognized, by all participants, as a solution to
an independently existing coordination problem. Traffic rules are an obvious ex-
ample, but one might also think about, for example, borders as solving territory
disputes, or the institution of a family as an efficient system for raising children.
The problems human institutions tend to solve have their roots in evolution, and it
is important that the role of an institution as a solution to a coordination problem
allows for a second role of the external point of view: does this or that institu-
tion offer an efficient, practical, feasible, or even morally acceptable solution to
the problem it pretends to solve? And was there a problem that had to be solved
in this way? This question, which is obviously inspired by Rudolf Carnap’s use
of the internal/external distinction in metaphysics (Carnap 1950), is an external
one (and not sufficiently appreciated by Shapiro, or Hart himself), although not a
purely theoretical one, because it asks a pragmatic question. Recent work on the
emergence of social institutions asks how and why fairly similar institutions can be
found in diverse cultural environments (Boyd & Richerson 2005). Such questions
Methode
issn: 2281-0498
215 Issue 6
Filip Buekens, Michaël Bauwens, and Lode Cossaer
are typically external because they do not require acceptance, although they presup-
pose that there are participants who accept and follow the rules. It should be noted,
however, that the fact that, unlike ludic games, institutions solve independently
existing coordination problems, does not entail that institutions are mere means
to an end. The law, qua institution, makes that very clear: participants do not see
their rights, privileges, obligations and immunities as means to achieve goals. The
rights, duties, permissions and entitlements state the right way to achieve a goal that
is often itself described in terms that refer back to the institution. The reason is that
achievements are often evaluated on the basis of how they came about (justice is
a nice example), and acceptance of an institution means that only ways prescribed
or allowed for by the institution are acceptable ways to achieve those goals. This
clearly differs from ordinary means-ends relations, where the means are, at least in
common cases, up to choice – the choice determined by efficiency. Once an insti-
tution is accepted, there are no other ways but those directed by the rules of the
institution to achieve certain goals. Those goals are, as stressed in Searle’s work,
not expressible unless one employs institutional concepts.
A third ‘external’ point of view is the more theoretical one that involves un-
derstanding ‘from the outside’ how the institution works. Anthropologists and
legal theorists who want to ‘understand’ how the law (or any other institution, for
that matter) works, exploit it. A final role for the external point of view is the
one we started with – it was the one Hart explicitly had in mind when he criti-
cized the idea that sanctions and behavioral modification was key to understanding
the law. Under descriptions like ‘X did F because he feared sanction S’, X’s mo-
tives are not understood, Hart argued, because they neglect the right reason for
which X, who accepts the institution, acted. It should be noted that this aspect
of the internal/external distinction played a prominent role in a famous paper by
P.F. Strawson (1962), another Oxford philosopher, who, in Freedom and Resent-
ment, defended compatibilism in the free will/determinism debate that was partly
inspired by Hart’s distinction. Strawson held that the external point of view on
ourselves and our actions, could not reveal our acceptance of a form of life that
involved the legitimate use of the reactive attitudes.
These considerations – that could be developed in various directions – show
that, although Hart’s internal/external distinction is a robustly binary one – no
graduality is involved – it is within the different points of view that various con-
cerns can be articulated. This brings us to Roversi’s issues and problems.
Roversi points at various ways in which an institution can be corroded or
strengthened by the positive or negative attitudes towards it, qua system, by par-
ticipants. Let us first discuss some of the alleged varieties within the ‘internal’
scheme of things, as described by Roversi. First, it should be noted that the same
individual – a player in a game, the lawyer in the court – can be both described
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as a participant (insofar as she acts under an institutional description) and from an
external point of view, when she interprets or contests the law. The chess teacher
acts intentionally under the description ‘moving the pawn to a black square’ (an
‘external’ description’) and ‘showing the novice how to play the Sicilian opening’
(a description that presupposes the internal point of view). Teaching chess requires
that the teacher accepts the rules of chess, which entails that, contrary to Roversi,
the chess teacher cannot occupy an external (not even a ‘minimally external’) point
of view. (A better way to state this is that teaching and, more generally, the learn-
ability of the rules of the game to and by others (‘newcomers’) is a key feature of
every institution: they are essentially learnable and transmittable to future genera-
tions. Think of languages here.) Thirdly, it is not clear how or to what extent the
‘bad chess player’s point of view is somehow ‘less’ internal than that of an expert.
Relative to the skills of my deceased grandfather, I am a bad player, but relative to
those of my son, I am an excellent one. But the three of us accept the institution
and the ensuing obligations (rights, permissions, etc.). Note that two of us were,
at least at a certain stage in our lives, also teachers. In Hart’s logic, any attempt to
cheat is by definition a criticizable attempt. The case of the cheating chess player
is better described as a case where one player is rightly criticized for not having
followed the rules, hence for not having followed certain obligations that apply to
her in virtue of playing a game of chess. The cheating chess player knows that the
rules of chess are good reasons for compliance (otherwise he wouldn’t play chess),
but she is – hopefully unbeknownst to her opponent – cheating. Cheating is al-
ways possible because further personal motives may overrule the reasons offered
by the institutions to the players. There is thus nothing ‘external’ to the cheater’s
position since she will accept that she can be criticized by others. Similarly with
the masochist: there is nothing in Hart’s theory (or at least our rendering of it)
that makes this behavior ‘external’, since the masochist fully accepts the rules –
and adds, as an additional reason, that she also intends to lose a game. That is
perfectly coherent. Is she playing sincerely? No, of course not (neither does the
bribed soccer player who intends to lose a game and thereby make a lot of money
with illegal gambling practices). Note that the further goal of cheating depends
on the capacity to occupy the internal point of view. (The analogy with speech
acts makes this very clear: the liar presents herself as believing that p, although she
knows that not-p).
Things become more interesting when we take into account that institutions
solve independently existing coordination problems. All institutions function in
the long run because they solve problems for cooperative individuals, even if they
are not aware of those problems and are not in the know about the institutional
character of the solution offered by the rules (Smit et al. 2013). Keeping up the use-
ful fiction that they are proceeding within an institutional framework, acceptance
Methode
issn: 2281-0498
217 Issue 6
Filip Buekens, Michaël Bauwens, and Lode Cossaer
of the rules is key to understanding their desire-independent reasons for acting
and the concepts they use to describe and evaluate their actions. Agents who act
within an institution also grasp the status indicators that obtain and which create
common knowledge among the participants that this or that rule here and now
obtains (or does not obtain). This ‘paradigmatic’ situation should be contrasted
with the following (non-exhaustive!) list of cases where people, for some reason or
other, question the rules or the institution. (We agree with Roversi that these are
the kind of phenomena that are under-studied in social ontology based on Searle’s
work.) First, one might deny that there is a problem that the institution criticized
solves. Critics of the state and its judicial apparatus might deny that life would
be brutish and short without the institution of the state, or that scarcity is not a
pre-institutional problem, but rather created by private property (an institution).
Secondly, they could, while accepting the problem the institution solves, propose
an alternative institution, as in the suggestion that a monarchy is better suited to
solve grand scale societal problems than a democracy, or accept that scarcity is a
real problem, but hold that capitalism is the wrong solution to it. A third option
would propose to break the rules of the institution in order to force change. The
problem with this is that initiators will be perceived as defectors, and that common
knowledge is needed to engage in massive protest against the institution (a theme
forcefully developed in (Chwe 2013)).
Do these ‘critical’ moves endanger the internal/external distinction? We don’t
think so. First, note that even those who engage in actions under descriptions
that are intentional derived from the rules of the institutions may be ‘bad men’,
in that they will act according to the rules albeit solely to avoid sanctions. The
person who follows the rules ‘for the wrong reasons’ does not occupy the internal
point of view, although she may be indifferent vis à vis the institution. Most critics
of particular institutions accept the rules for the time being but not ‘because the
institution as such is accepted’. The genuinely external point of view is occupied
either by the theorist who aims at a better understanding of the institution, or
by the outsider who denies that institutions offer desire-independent reasons and
confines its role to distributing sanctions over those who do not comply with it.
Conclusion
The best way to strengthen the viability of an institution is to accept the co-
ordination problem as a genuine problem and the way the particular institution
solves it. The latter is made manifest by acting within the institution and thereby
to ensure its existence. There is, as Hart and many others have stressed, no exter-
nal ‘foundation’ for the institution on which a defense of the rules and the viability
of the practice can rest. Hart’s distinction between the internal and the external
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point of view is, in a sense, orthogonal to the issues Roversi sketches, because even
according to him, those who occupy the external point of view must have an un-
derstanding of the rules and at least comply with them. This is consistent with
criticizing and even rejecting the rules or the institution as a good or viable so-
lution. The problem is thus not the binary character of the distinction, but the
way acceptance of the rules pro tem may be compatible with views of how the
institution can be changed, modified or rejected.
A final comment on the use of Speech Act theory (of the Searlean kind) as
a paradigm for institutional actions. We have already seen that acting intention-
ally within an institution presupposes that the token action is intentional under
a description that draws on institutional concepts. Roversi suggests that such an
action should be analyzed in terms of a distinction between the performance of
an act a according to a constitutive role, and F being the specific use, or strategy,
the agent is implementing by way of that performance. This distinction, it is then
suggested, can help describing the difference between then beginner’s and the ex-
pert player’s moves. ‘In a sense, the child knows perfectly well the ‘semantics’ of
chess moves, but has a very rough idea of their ‘pragmatics’, and this pragmatic
dimension is exactly that which is missing in the description made according to the
Rule conception of institutional action.’
We think there is a much better account of the distinction underlying Roversi’s
distinction between the semantics and the pragmatics of what one might call insti-
tutional actions. Suppose you are following the traffic rules – you are driving home
keeping left, you stop when the traffic lights turn red, and you keep sufficient dis-
tance from the driver before you (this was written in Belgium, not Italy.) Novice
drivers learn these rules and thereby act according to the institution of traffic. What
is the pragmatics here? We have already seen that every institution solves and in-
dependently existing coordination problem, and the problem in this context is the
independently existing problem of getting home safely, on time, without harming
others engaged in more or less the same endeavor. That’s the point of most if not all
institutional actions: you follow the rules in order to realize a further goal. Taking
into account this ‘perlocutionary’ goal is better suited as a candidate for the ‘prag-
matics’ of institutional rule-following than Roversi’s appeal to illocutionary forces:
every institutional action is done with a further, non-institutional goal in mind.
What the child learns is the collectively accepted way of achieving a certain goal.
It is true that Searle, and many others, often write as if institutional actions have
no extra-institutional goal, but that is highly misleading. We play chess to amuse
ourselves, we sue others because they have harmed us, we buy country houses in
order to live quietly, and order drinks in order to quench our thirst. We have a
good idea of the pragmatics of institutional actions, but the pragmatic dimension
of those actions does not seem to be reducible to acting according to certain rules.
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We do not play chess because we accept the rules.
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